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שוב פעם בדלת האחורית... אתה זוכר את השרשור המיתולוגי ההוא כמעט 170 הודעות!. הסכמנו שלא להסכים - בשורה התחתונה. ואגב - התגובה שלך מאוד לא רלוונטית אפילו מתנשאת - "אבל "לא קשור" שלך ממילא מייתר כל דיון ענייני". בכל אופן סובורוב בעיני הינו שרלטן ציני וערמומי, שלא הוכיח כל טענה שלו. אגב הוא באמת היה צריך להיות עו"ד כפי שכתבתה בזמנו באתר שלך אם אינני טועה. הוא היה צריך להטיל ספק בראיות התביעה ולא להוכיח כי הנאשם הוא חף מפשע...
שוב פעם בדלת האחורית... אתה זוכר את השרשור המיתולוגי ההוא כמעט 170 הודעות!. הסכמנו שלא להסכים - בשורה התחתונה. ואגב - התגובה שלך מאוד לא רלוונטית אפילו מתנשאת - "אבל "לא קשור" שלך ממילא מייתר כל דיון ענייני". בכל אופן סובורוב בעיני הינו שרלטן ציני וערמומי, שלא הוכיח כל טענה שלו. אגב הוא באמת היה צריך להיות עו"ד כפי שכתבתה בזמנו באתר שלך אם אינני טועה. הוא היה צריך להטיל ספק בראיות התביעה ולא להוכיח כי הנאשם הוא חף מפשע...
תלוי מה זה חכם
הוא מפרט כיצד סטאלין, מתוך "קונצפציה" מחליט להתעלם מכל האזהרות שהוא מקבל, מהקגב, מקומוניסטים גרמניים, מקומוניסטים בפולין ובמרכז אירופה, מהצבא שלו, מצ'רצ'יל. מצד שני, מלחכי הפנכה שלו כל כך פוחדים ממנו, לטענת גורדוצקי, שהם תמיד מסייגים את המידע שהם מוסרים לסטאלין. לדעתי זה לא תיאור של חכם... נקודת הזכות היחידה שגורודצקי מוצא בסטאלין היא שהוא ידע כמה חלש עלוב ולא מוכן הצבא האדום בעקבות הטיהורים שעשה ולכן הוא מעכב את המלחמה ככל האפשר. מצד שני, גם כאשר יש מידע סופי ומיידי על פרוץ מלחמה מיידית, סטאלין מונע צעדי תגבור מחשש כי זו תהיה "פרובוקציה"
הוא מפרט כיצד סטאלין, מתוך "קונצפציה" מחליט להתעלם מכל האזהרות שהוא מקבל, מהקגב, מקומוניסטים גרמניים, מקומוניסטים בפולין ובמרכז אירופה, מהצבא שלו, מצ'רצ'יל. מצד שני, מלחכי הפנכה שלו כל כך פוחדים ממנו, לטענת גורדוצקי, שהם תמיד מסייגים את המידע שהם מוסרים לסטאלין. לדעתי זה לא תיאור של חכם... נקודת הזכות היחידה שגורודצקי מוצא בסטאלין היא שהוא ידע כמה חלש עלוב ולא מוכן הצבא האדום בעקבות הטיהורים שעשה ולכן הוא מעכב את המלחמה ככל האפשר. מצד שני, גם כאשר יש מידע סופי ומיידי על פרוץ מלחמה מיידית, סטאלין מונע צעדי תגבור מחשש כי זו תהיה "פרובוקציה"
התיאוריות של סובורב , נפסלות על ידי
רוב ההיסטוריונים, המערב, וגם ברוסיה. קטונתי כמובן מלשפוט בויכוח הזה , אך הנה מה שכתוב על הביקורת נגדו בויקיפדיה: Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareyev and Dmitri Volkogonov. One criticism of Suvorov's work is that he did not complete his analysis of the disastrous beginning of the war. While it may be possible that Suvorov is correct in discerning Stalin's true plans and exposing the huge hardware potential of the Soviet military machine, he unreasonably dismisses the traditional arguments about problems plaguing the Red Army — Among these: poor leadership after the purges of 1938 and low morale. While Suvorov attempted to address these points in his later books, the dispute remains unsettled. Antonov A-40 "flying tank"An example of Suvorov's arguments is his citation of the development of the KT/A-40 Antonov "flying tank" as evidence of Stalin's aggressive plans. Critics suggest that much of this type of evidence is not convincing, or can be explained in terms other than those of Suvorov. Military historian David Glantz disputed the argument that the Red Army was deployed in an offensive stance in 1941. Glantz work demonstrates that the Red Army was in a state of partial mobilization in July 1941 from which neither effective defensive nor offensive action could be offered without considerable delay. Regarding Hitler's alleged pre-emptive intentions, Erickson has claimed that “what really concerned Hitler was not Soviet aggression but Soviet concessions to Germany, which could frustrate his own grand design, depriving him of a pretext to attack.”[4] Another criticism of Suvorov's position includes the claim that there is no evidence that Stalin ever "encouraged" Hitler to start WWII. In his political works, Stalin was always firmly opposed to Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution, implementation of which regarded worldwide war and other countries' usurpation as necessary (because practice showed that war, the ultimate devastation, could create revolutionary conditions that usually did not occur in any natural way). Stalin instead insisted on the policy of Socialism in One Country which promoted separation and peaceful standalone development of socialism in a selected country, while waiting for two-stage revolutions that would lead other countries to socialism. Conventional theory states that Stalin prepared the Soviet Army for international war because he knew he would have to free Europe of Fascism, and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was nothing more than the way to suspend the war with Nazism - exactly for the purpose to have time for preparations that Suvorov's researches exposed. However, it is Suvorov's contention[5] that the Communist system inherently demands both outward claims of peaceful intent, and the secret but nevertheless inescapable long-term imperative of the conversion of capitalist states to Communism lest those living under Communism draw unfavourable comparison. Under this theory, whether Hitler would ever have attacked the Soviet Union or not is irrelevant; the mere existence of a non-Communist state is by definition complete justification for aggression. Suvorov cites Soviet attitudes towards Romania as an example of this; although the Ceauşescu regime maintained an aggressively independent stance towards the Soviet Union for many years, no invasion took place such as were launched against Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968; because, Suvorov claims, no Soviet citizen envied the Romanians. A middle position seems to be taken by the Israeli historian Martin van Creveld. In an interview in the April 11, 2005 edition of the German news magazine FOCUS, which is the third largest weekly magazine in Germany, he said: "I doubt that Stalin wanted to attack as early as autumn 1941, as some writers argue. But I have no doubt that sooner or later, if Germany would have been entangled in a war with Great Britain and the USA, he would have taken what he wanted. Judging by the talks between Ribbentrop and Molotov in November 1940 this would have been Romania, Bulgaria, an access to the North Sea, the Dardanelles and probably those parts of Poland that were under German control at that time." Asked to what degree the leaders of the Wehrmacht needed to feel threatened by the Soviet military buildup, van Creveld replies "very much" and adds: "In 1941 the Red Army was the largest army in the world. Stalin may, as I said, not have planned to attack Germany in autumn 1941. But it would be hard to believe that he would not have taken the opportunity to stab the Reich in the back sometime." Suvorov's critics argue that the suggestion that Stalin regarded war with Nazi Germany as inevitable sits oddly with the undisputed fact that the attack by Nazi Germany in 1941 took Stalin completely by surprise. On the other hand, the fact that Stalin was taken completely by surprise doesn't suit the established history either, as it is often claimed that Stalin was paranoical about a possible foreign invasion and had concentrated on defensive policies. The criticism was addressed in detail in Suvorov's book Suicide.
רוב ההיסטוריונים, המערב, וגם ברוסיה. קטונתי כמובן מלשפוט בויכוח הזה , אך הנה מה שכתוב על הביקורת נגדו בויקיפדיה: Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareyev and Dmitri Volkogonov. One criticism of Suvorov's work is that he did not complete his analysis of the disastrous beginning of the war. While it may be possible that Suvorov is correct in discerning Stalin's true plans and exposing the huge hardware potential of the Soviet military machine, he unreasonably dismisses the traditional arguments about problems plaguing the Red Army — Among these: poor leadership after the purges of 1938 and low morale. While Suvorov attempted to address these points in his later books, the dispute remains unsettled. Antonov A-40 "flying tank"An example of Suvorov's arguments is his citation of the development of the KT/A-40 Antonov "flying tank" as evidence of Stalin's aggressive plans. Critics suggest that much of this type of evidence is not convincing, or can be explained in terms other than those of Suvorov. Military historian David Glantz disputed the argument that the Red Army was deployed in an offensive stance in 1941. Glantz work demonstrates that the Red Army was in a state of partial mobilization in July 1941 from which neither effective defensive nor offensive action could be offered without considerable delay. Regarding Hitler's alleged pre-emptive intentions, Erickson has claimed that “what really concerned Hitler was not Soviet aggression but Soviet concessions to Germany, which could frustrate his own grand design, depriving him of a pretext to attack.”[4] Another criticism of Suvorov's position includes the claim that there is no evidence that Stalin ever "encouraged" Hitler to start WWII. In his political works, Stalin was always firmly opposed to Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution, implementation of which regarded worldwide war and other countries' usurpation as necessary (because practice showed that war, the ultimate devastation, could create revolutionary conditions that usually did not occur in any natural way). Stalin instead insisted on the policy of Socialism in One Country which promoted separation and peaceful standalone development of socialism in a selected country, while waiting for two-stage revolutions that would lead other countries to socialism. Conventional theory states that Stalin prepared the Soviet Army for international war because he knew he would have to free Europe of Fascism, and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was nothing more than the way to suspend the war with Nazism - exactly for the purpose to have time for preparations that Suvorov's researches exposed. However, it is Suvorov's contention[5] that the Communist system inherently demands both outward claims of peaceful intent, and the secret but nevertheless inescapable long-term imperative of the conversion of capitalist states to Communism lest those living under Communism draw unfavourable comparison. Under this theory, whether Hitler would ever have attacked the Soviet Union or not is irrelevant; the mere existence of a non-Communist state is by definition complete justification for aggression. Suvorov cites Soviet attitudes towards Romania as an example of this; although the Ceauşescu regime maintained an aggressively independent stance towards the Soviet Union for many years, no invasion took place such as were launched against Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968; because, Suvorov claims, no Soviet citizen envied the Romanians. A middle position seems to be taken by the Israeli historian Martin van Creveld. In an interview in the April 11, 2005 edition of the German news magazine FOCUS, which is the third largest weekly magazine in Germany, he said: "I doubt that Stalin wanted to attack as early as autumn 1941, as some writers argue. But I have no doubt that sooner or later, if Germany would have been entangled in a war with Great Britain and the USA, he would have taken what he wanted. Judging by the talks between Ribbentrop and Molotov in November 1940 this would have been Romania, Bulgaria, an access to the North Sea, the Dardanelles and probably those parts of Poland that were under German control at that time." Asked to what degree the leaders of the Wehrmacht needed to feel threatened by the Soviet military buildup, van Creveld replies "very much" and adds: "In 1941 the Red Army was the largest army in the world. Stalin may, as I said, not have planned to attack Germany in autumn 1941. But it would be hard to believe that he would not have taken the opportunity to stab the Reich in the back sometime." Suvorov's critics argue that the suggestion that Stalin regarded war with Nazi Germany as inevitable sits oddly with the undisputed fact that the attack by Nazi Germany in 1941 took Stalin completely by surprise. On the other hand, the fact that Stalin was taken completely by surprise doesn't suit the established history either, as it is often claimed that Stalin was paranoical about a possible foreign invasion and had concentrated on defensive policies. The criticism was addressed in detail in Suvorov's book Suicide.
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